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Private Offerings and Public Ends:
Reconsidering the Regime for Classification of
Investors Under the Securities Act of 1933
JONATHAN D. GLATER
Investment in private offerings of securities, those that take place off of
public exchanges and that are exempt from federal disclosure rules
applicable to public offerings, is primarily available to investors on the
basis of wealth. The wealthy are presumed sophisticated enough to make
informed decisions about what to buy without mandatory disclosures
applicable to public offerings. Yet the financial crisis of 2008 made clear
that wealthy and ostensibly sophisticated investors can make tremendous
mistakes and suffer enormous losses. Those losses are a problem when the
investor serves a public goal, such as providing income to public sector
employees. This Article argues that investment in private offerings by
institutions serving a public mission should be limited to ensure that public
ends are protected.
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Private Offerings and Public Ends:
Reconsidering the Regime for Classification of
Investors Under the Securities Act of 1933
JONATHAN D. GLATER*
I. INTRODUCTION
To an ever greater degree, we rely on investments in securities1 to
achieve socially desirable public goals, such as enabling saving for
retirement.2 One might expect that as a result, investment activity of
entities managing workers’ retirement savings, for example, might be
narrowly circumscribed to ensure they achieve their goal. Yet federal
securities laws do not provide for consideration of an institutional
investor’s raison d’être in determining whether that institution can or
should buy securities in private offerings. Private offerings are potentially
riskier transactions that take place off of public exchanges, are typically3
available by invitation only, and are exempt from the formal federal
*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. The author wishes to thank
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Lawrence G. Baxter, Deborah A. DeMott, Jill Fisch, Camille Gear-Rich,
Marc-Tizoc González, Donald Langevoort, Sarah Lawsky, Stephen Lee, Christopher Leslie, Stephen
Rich, Frank Partnoy, Michael Perino, Elizabeth Pollman, Elbert L. Robertson, Bertrall Ross, Margaret
V. Sachs, Kenneth Stahl, Christopher Whytock, and participants in the 2015 National Business Law
Scholars Conference and the 2012 John Mercer Langston Law Faculty Writing Workshop for
invaluable help refining the ideas in this Article. The author is deeply indebted to Joy Shoemaker,
Brendan Starkey, Christina Tsou, and Jackie Woodside of the University of California, Irvine Law
Library for their expert research assistance.
1
See William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, 135
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (Dec. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/12/art1full.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/E8AW-XPJ8] (reporting that only ten percent of all private sector businesses offer defined
benefit retirement plans). Additionally, more than two-thirds of workers in 2011 depended on defined
contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, for retirement income. FAQs About Benefits—Retirement
Issues, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., http://www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq14
[http://perma.cc/BH9V-GAWN] (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
2
Another example is saving to pay for education expenses. But there are also institutions that
serve the needs of third parties and invest funds in financial markets to support the business, like
insurance companies. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing insurer investments and the
potential need for enhanced regulation).
3
Relatively new regulations permit the advertising of opportunities to purchase unregistered
securities without triggering the registration requirements otherwise applicable, provided that all
purchasers of the securities sold are “accredited investors.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2) (2014).
“Accredited investors” include banks, insurance companies, investment companies, employee benefit
plans, and other entities with assets under management with values above specified thresholds. Id.
§ 230.501(a) (2013).
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disclosure rules applicable to public offerings.
Institutional investors qualify as “accredited” and may participate in
private offerings if they meet certain simple wealth thresholds, regardless
of their ability to evaluate risk or to absorb potential losses. As many as
thirty-five investors that are not accredited but that are “sophisticated” may
also participate in private offerings.4 The rules identifying who can invest
in private offerings thus reflect a belief in the premise that wealthy
investors have the expertise to manage risk well, as well as the premise that
the losses they may suffer will not have broader systemic or societal
impact.5 This Article argues that pre-crisis investor missteps should
provoke very critical questioning of both these premises. The Article
contends that these standards are overly permissive and that as a result they
endanger investors, the system in which they operate, and—most
significantly—the public ends that some institutional investors serve.
Court filings in cases filed by investors that have lost significant
amounts on securities purchased in private offerings illustrate the problem.
Court documents show that very wealthy investors in private offerings
bought securities, the workings or potential consequences of which they
did not understand, or chose to ignore. Some of these investors served
public goals, such as managing retirement savings of government
employees. Consider the experience of the San Diego County Employees
Retirement Association (SDCERA), which as of this writing manages a
pension fund tasked with providing retirement benefits to nearly 37,000
current and former county employees.6 The value of the Association’s
assets reached $8.5 billion in 2012.7 In September 2005, SDCERA
invested $175 million in Amaranth Partners LLC, a Connecticut-based
hedge fund,8 in a private offering. Amaranth collapsed a year later after
losing $6.5 billion in a matter of weeks.9 SDCERA lost well over $100

4

See id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
The former point is explicit in Supreme Court commentary on exempt offerings of securities;
the latter is implicit, but has not been directly addressed. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 125 (1953) (“An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction
‘not involving any public offering.’”).
6
Facts at a Glance, SAN DIEGO CNTY. EMP. RET. ASS’N 1 (Jan. 2013), https://web.archive.org/
web/20130522003448/http://www.sdcera.org/PDF/Facts_at_a_glance-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2A5
-8S3F]. At the time of the pension fund’s investment in Amaranth, it served approximately 33,000
people. Id.
7
Id. at 2.
8
Hedge funds are entities created with the goal of combining investment positions in different
types of assets, with a goal of earning the maximum return in various market conditions. Hedge Funds,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm [http://per
ma.cc/9897-NKW6].
9
Jenny Anderson, After Loss, Hedge Fund Will Close, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at C6.
5
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million of its original investment and filed a lawsuit accusing Amaranth
of securities fraud: SDCERA claimed it had been induced to invest in
Amaranth by false and misleading statements about the fund’s investment
strategy.11 “SDCERA’s investment in the Fund would never have even
occurred—and would certainly have been withdrawn—but for . . . repeated
misrepresentation of the Fund as risk-managed, diversified, and
conservative.”12 A federal judge dismissed SDCERA’s claim, finding that
SDCERA was a “sophisticated investor” and, as a result, could not claim
after the fact not to have understood, or not to have been able to monitor,
the fund’s conduct.13 In other words, SDCERA’s wealth qualified it to
invest in the private offering, and it either did or should have known better.
Under the criteria typically applied to private placements,14 the judge
was correct and the plaintiffs were sophisticated investors. This is so even
though the complaint and briefs in the case suggest that the investors did
not act in a sophisticated fashion; they attempted neither to verify the
representations allegedly made by Amaranth officers nor to reconcile those
representations with the language of the contract with the fund.15 The
plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their federal action alleging securities fraud
because they could not establish that they reasonably relied upon alleged
misrepresentations by Amaranth and its officers.16 And as a consequence,
the financial resources available to SDCERA to satisfy its obligations to

10
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Complaint for
Failure to State a Claim at 17, San Diego Cnty. Emp. Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (07 Civ. 2618 (DAB)), 2007 WL 2960234.
11
See id. at 1 (“[Defendants] expressly portrayed the Fund as a multi-strategy, risk-managed
investment that eschewed the promise of ‘home run’ returns from risky gambles in favor of modest
gains achieved through diversification, hedging and active risk management.”).
12
Id. at 2.
13
See Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 120–21 (explaining how SDCERA’s status as a sophisticated
investor, and efforts by its agents to read and sign the Fund’s Subscription Agreement, made its claim
of reliance on the Fund unreasonable).
14
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014) (“[A sophisticated investor] has such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment.”); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Hurdles of Different Heights for Securities
Fraud Litigants of Different Types, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 47, 74 (explaining how courts have not
identified fixed markers of sophistication).
15
See Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 109–10 (explaining that from December 2004 to September
2005, SDCERA alleged that its due diligence with regards to Amaranth consisted solely of
conversations and that it relied on representations by the Fund).
16
See Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 450 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘Under
New York law, for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of fraud, he must prove . . . a material representation
or omission of fact,’ as well as ‘reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.’” (quoting Schlaifer
Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1997))); Bremanger v. Citigroup Global
Markets Inc., 2013 WL 1294615, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Terra for an example of unreasonable
reliance).
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tens of thousands of people were diminished.
The losses suffered by SDCERA and other institutional investors with
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars under management highlight the
problem in securities law that is the focus of this Article: the regulations
classifying investors to whom sellers may offer securities through private
placements do not function as an effective screen. The limits neither
protect investors from transactions that are too complex and/or risky for
them, nor do they protect the achievement of the public goals that many
institutional investors may serve. The consequences of these failures were
evident in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, which demonstrated that
the risks of widespread, poor investment outcomes extend well beyond the
parties involved in particular transactions. This Article describes the
shortcomings of the criteria18 that determine which investors may
participate in private offerings and identifies investor characteristics that
should better predict investor acumen. But the Article’s greater
contribution consists of a proposal to adopt a novel criterion to evaluate the
extent to which an investor should be able to purchase in a private offering.
That criterion, which the Article refers to as “financial resilience,” is a
measure of an investor’s ability to absorb losses while still achieving any
public end that the investor serves.
This notion of resilience incorporates into the analysis of an investor’s
fitness to invest in a private placement the uses to which the money and
any return on its investment are to be put, and reframes the question of
investor sophistication—an exercise in classification—as an essential
element in a larger, more fundamental debate over what it means for an
entity to be “public.” The Article consequently emphasizes the extent to
which the current regime that identifies investors eligible to participate in
certain transactions functions in a particular historical moment, a moment
in which the United States has reallocated a greater share of the
responsibility for achievement of meaningful public goals away from the
government.
Adoption of the concept of financial resilience sets this Article’s
discussion and proposal apart from those of prior scholars who have
examined the difficulty of measuring investor sophistication and takes into
account both changes in financial market participation and the greater role
that institutional investors play in serving public goals. More than in the
past, public pension funds, for example, which workers depend on, buy

17
By how much, of course, is difficult to assess; this is not information included in court filings,
for example.
18
Or criteria based on income or assets under management, as provided in other provisions under
Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a), 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014)
(defining accredited and sophisticated investors).
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less liquid securities directly through private offerings and indirectly by
investing in entities, like hedge funds, that invest in private offerings.20 The
2008 financial crisis makes plain that resilience matters because excessive
investment in risky securities can contribute to systemic risk;21 when large
financial companies suffer losses that prevent them from performing on
their obligations, the effects ripple across markets.
This Article is one step in a larger project exploring the implications of
the evolution of financial markets, using the financial crisis of 2008 as a
point of entry.22 A prior article examined post-financial crisis securities
fraud litigation, which affords a means of protecting investors ex post, and
argued that the legal regime governing such lawsuits favors investors in
private offerings relative to investors that purchase in public offerings.23
The disparity, according to the prior article, was unjustified and weakened
an incentive for private placement investors to investigate transactions
adequately ahead of time.24 This Article in turn focuses on the regime
intended to protect investors ex ante from entering transactions beyond
their capacity.25 A future article will analyze alternative means of limiting
the participation of particular types of investors in private offerings, such
19
See Gretchen Morgenson, How You Can Pay Millions and Lag Behind the Market, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2013, at BU1 (“[A]lternative investments [such as hedge funds and private equity funds] now
account for almost one-quarter of the roughly $2.6 trillion in public pension assets under management
nationwide, up from 10 percent in 2006 . . . . Investments in public companies’ shares, by contrast, fell
to 49 percent from 61 percent in the period.”).
20
More private equity firms are actively wooing public pension funds as investors, as well. See,
e.g., Julie Creswell, Buyout Firms Are Chasing Sky-High Sums for Next Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2013, at B1 (describing efforts by thousands of private equity firms to attract “state retirement systems,
corporate pension funds and wealthy investors” as investors, with a goal of raising $750 billion).
21
Indeed, systemic risk could properly be viewed as a specific manifestation of the larger
problem this Article addresses. The proper functioning of financial markets is itself a public goal,
benefitting the larger society, and systemic risk undermines the achievement of that goal.
22
This is a topic approached from different angles by scholars including Steven L. Schwarcz and
Steven M. Davidoff. See Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the
New Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 340–41 (2008) (describing changes in capital
markets as a result of growth of private exchanges, the growing role of institutional investors and rapid
innovation, and identifying failures of federal securities regulation to keep pace); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1109 (questioning
the efficacy of securities regulation regimes that make disclosure a priority when the financial crisis
suggests that purchasers of risky securities did not understand the information disclosed); see also
Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in
Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1573–74 (2013) (analyzing changes to
securities laws wrought through the JOBS Act of 2012). This Article also attempts to evaluate how
well current legal and regulatory mechanisms protect investors and enhance stability in addressing
potential securities fraud. This Article contributes to an ongoing discussion of links between financial
market evolution and systemic risk, and raises questions about how to prevent the poor decisions that
pave the way to a crisis.
23
Glater, supra note 14, at 87–88.
24
Id. at 51.
25
“Capacity” in this context should be understood to encompass both investor ability to
comprehend a transaction and ability to cope with adverse investment outcomes.
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as developing a more nuanced and sophisticated definition of fiduciary
duty for managers of public pension funds,26 or enacting legislative
restrictions on public pension fund investments at the state level.27 These
articles all reflect the concern that too many investors lacking necessary
expertise and/or resources participate in private offerings, and in doing so
pose a risk both to the broader financial system and to the achievement of
public policy objectives affecting people far from Wall Street.
The discussion that follows has four parts. Part II contends that the
proper context for analysis of legislative and regulatory treatment of
private offerings is the ongoing, intense debate over the meaning of the
designation “public.”28 This Part situates the Article in that discussion,
which in the past has focused primarily on the questions of when and why
a particular corporate entity should be subject to a particular regulatory
regime.29 This Part argues that the implications of taking into account the
public effects of the conduct of a corporate entity, or indeed of any nongovernmental entity, extend much farther.
Part III proposes that limits on participation in private offerings
appropriately protect certain investors’ public missions. This Part provides
a concise history of the law and regulations intended to screen investors in
private placements and explains the significance, benefits and risks of
these transactions in modern financial markets. This Part analyzes the
rationale for exemptions to the general requirement that securities be
registered. It then identifies problems under the exemption regime and
reviews criticisms by scholars who have argued that it fails to address the
twin problems of the sophisticated investor who is not actually
sophisticated or the investor that, however sophisticated, should not be
permitted to take on excessive risk because a negative investment outcome
26
An expanded concept of fiduciary duty could force an investor with a public mission to account
for the possible effects of a poor investment outcome. Professor David Webber argues for adoption of a
more nuanced definition of fiduciary duty in the context of union pension fund investment that may
contribute to eventual elimination of union employees’ job opportunities. David Webber, The Use and
Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 2116 (2014) (“I argue that, in connection with fund
investments, public pension trustees’ fiduciary duties run to the participants and beneficiaries
themselves, and not to the fund alone.”). A broader recognition of fiduciary duty could be achieved
through litigation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See Anne Tucker, Retirement
Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 215–19
(2013) (describing potential reforms strengthening the fiduciary duty).
27
Internal rules, developed by an institution that serves a public mission or by the state whose
employees depend on it, could also limit the extent of investment in particular types of securities.
28
As Professor Hillary A. Sale has put it, “[t]he recent financial crisis has brought the publicness
and impact of corporations to the forefront of people’s minds.” Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public”
Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 142 (2011).
29
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 340–41 (2013) (observing that securities
regulation is about more than just investor protection and that regulatory and legislative goals include
constraining corporate power).
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would compromise its ability to complete its public mission.
Part IV outlines a proposal for adoption of superior criteria regulating
access to private offerings, and uses the experience of SDCERA to
illustrate how the proposal would apply. The proposal includes an
alternative framework for classification of investors based on the investors’
prior experience. More importantly, though, the proposal subordinates the
determination of expertise on the basis of investor characteristics to
protection of any public goal that the investor serves, thus imposing on the
current regulatory framework new requirements that take into account the
publicness of the investor’s mission. This proposal advocates adoption of a
more flexible, nuanced version of the restriction on public pension fund
participation in private offerings that existed prior to 1989.30
Part V concludes.
II. PUBLICNESS
In proposing that the public purpose of investment should affect
regulatory restrictions on the transactions an investor can participate in,
this Article argues that investment activity that is not currently understood
as “public” should be. Consequently, the first step must be clarifying what
it means to be public. This Part undertakes that task, beginning by
distinguishing the meaning of publicness in the context of corporate and
securities law from its meanings in other, broader settings. This Part then
traces a more nuanced understanding of publicness in recent scholarship on
the classification of corporate entities and contends that adoption of a
broader understanding of the concept is not merely appropriate in securities
regulation, but is essential.
A. Public Things
It is an unfortunate accident that discussion of what it means to be
public must confront the classification of a particular corporate form. To be
public in the context of corporate and securities law is to be described and
defined by law. An entity designated as a “public company” is one in
which ownership is widely distributed across the holders of its tradable
shares.31 Status as a public company carries ongoing regulatory
obligations, such as the filing of periodic reports intended to ensure that
investors have adequate information to decide how to value and whether to
purchase the company’s shares.32 The largest public companies, whose
30
See infra note 186 and accompanying text (describing regulatory changes to permit public
pension funds to invest in private offerings).
31
Public Companies, INVESTOR.GOV, http://investor.gov/introduction-markets/how-markets-work
/public-companies#.VMpfMcaOKgc [http://perma.cc/3HXK-E3ST] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).
32
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012).
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aggregate shares may exceed some nations’ gross domestic product, exist
in a media spotlight, and their corporate conduct can have outsize effects
on the world economy, as well as on the members of the public.
Attention to the largest companies makes sense given other aspects of
the definition of “public.” Such public companies are prominent, wellknown, observed. They are also accessible,33 because not only is ownership
open to any investor willing to pay the market price, but also because
disclosure requirements impose a degree of transparency on the entity. By
law, public companies provide details of their governance and financial
well-being.
When Congress approved the legislative framework that still shapes
modern financial markets in the years after the Great Depression,
lawmakers understood all too well the public consequences of investor
conduct previously performed beyond the reach of federal law. The
consequences of investor mistakes and misconduct “spell[ed] tragedy in
the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings,
accumulated after years of effort”34 and prompted the adoption of the
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”).35 The Securities Act sought to
protect investors by ensuring adequate disclosure of information relevant
to the valuation of a security offered for sale, in order to promote capital
formation for the growth of business and restore confidence in financial
markets.36 However, the Securities Act exempted transactions from its
registration requirement and formal disclosure regime “where the public
benefits are too remote.”37 The 2008 crisis has shown that private offerings
are closer to the public than was previously believed.38
Unfortunately, perhaps because the landmark Securities Act and the
Securities Exchange Act of 193439 (“Exchange Act”) defined what it
means to be a public company, there has been little subsequent sustained
legislative and regulatory attention to the question of whether and under
what circumstances conduct that could be viewed as private should be
understood as public. Rather, consideration of the question has typically
occurred in reaction to a crisis and has focused on the proper steps the
government should take to avert a similar disaster in the future. The result
33
The definition is instructive. The first definition offered by one dictionary is “exposed to
general view,” and the second is “of, relating to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a nation
or state.” Definition of “Public”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/public [http://perma.cc/3JN6-6WHB] (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
34
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
35
Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)).
36
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–2 (1933).
37
Id. at 5.
38
See infra note 108 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the financial crisis on
public pension funds).
39
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
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has been the adoption of new laws and regulations seeking to correct
perceived failures by specific individuals and entities—commercial or
investment banks, for example—to consider the very public, social harms
they caused. But such policy responses have not tackled the underlying
question of the proper meaning of the term “public.”
For example, in the wake of a series of corporate scandals involving
prominent publicly traded companies like Enron and WorldCom, Congress
approved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.40 That law, informed by the
accounting and governance improprieties at some of the nation’s largest
companies, imposed new reporting and management requirements on
public companies and created a new agency, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, as an overseer.41 A few years later, in the
wake of a financial crisis that pushed the nation as close as it has come to
the Great Depression, Congress acted again, this time approving the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.42 Informed by
revelations of poor investment oversight and excessive risk-taking by some
of the nation’s largest companies, the law imposed additional governance
requirements on public companies and required additional disclosures.
The more abstract question of when corporate and/or investor conduct
should be understood as public unfortunately did not receive attention in
the debates over either of these laws, which addressed specific, perceived
shortcomings in the pre-crisis financial regulatory regime. As Professor
Hillary A. Sale has observed, these laws represented incursions into
previously unregulated aspects of corporate conduct not on a systematic
basis and not as a result of a comprehensive analysis of the rationale
underlying the federal role in financial markets, but rather because private
actors failed in concrete and spectacular fashion to regulate specific aspects
of their business or investment practices themselves.43
B. Aspects of Publicness
To be public has a much broader meaning in other contexts beyond
financial regulation. The United States is a republic, a form whose name
derives from the Latin phrase res publica, translated in its simplest terms
as the “public thing.”44 Public connotes service to the community, perhaps
to society at large, as well as community ownership and responsibility for

40

Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2012).
42
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12,
and 15 U.S.C.).
43
Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1022 (2013).
44
Definition of “Res Publica”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, http://www.merr
iam-webster.com/dictionary/republic [http://perma.cc/942S-2TAX] (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
41
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whatever is public. Politicians speak of a “public trust,” students assert an
interest in “public service,” and government entities, like municipal
agencies responsible for the quality of streets or provision of subsidized
housing, have titles that include the term.46 Thus to be public has particular
meanings that reflect the use that the public thing serves. A public good, as
an economist would define it, is one that benefits the community. It is this
meaning of publicness, which captures the impact of corporate conduct on
the community, that corporate and securities law scholars like Professor
Sale,47 Donald E. Langevoort and Robert Thompson,48 and Lisa M.
Fairfax,49 among others,50 have pondered lately in various ways.
Interest in the potential public purposes of corporations has not been
limited to the academy, however. The legislatures of several states have
recently adopted laws making it possible for corporations, designated
“benefit corporations,”51 to serve a public mission alongside the traditional
goal of generating profits to benefit investors.52 These legislative
developments in turn have drawn scholarly attention,53 although those
writing on new legislation have not yet gone so far as to explore the public
effects of conduct by private companies.
The possibility of explicitly serving multiple constituencies created by
new state laws opens up intriguing and difficult questions about how
managers and directors of for-profit entities should weigh the impacts of
corporate decisions on parties who are not investors.54 Efforts to answer
45
See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Procurement (Mar. 4,
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Procurement-3/4/09/
[http://perma.cc/2VL2-P5RD] (describing a “fundamental public trust that we must uphold” by
reforming federal government contracting procedures).
46
For example, the City of Cambridge is served by the Department of Public Works, responsible
for services including collection of recycling and trash. See CAMBRIDGE DEP’T PUB. WORKS,
http://www.cambridgema.gov/TheWorks/ [http://perma.cc/P9V3-983R] (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
47
See Sale, supra note 43 (analyzing limits imposed by Congress on public company corporate
governance).
48
See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29 (discussing a framework for classifying public
companies).
49
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 409, 414–24 (2002) (analyzing the implications and effects of conversions of previously
publicly operated entities like hospitals and primary and secondary schools into private, for-profit
corporations).
50
For example, the concept of “publicness” was the subject of an extended discussion at a
roundtable at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual meeting in 2014.
51
For illustration, this is the designation used in California. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610 (West
2015).
52
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?,
14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 249 (2014).
53
See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 49, at 426–30 (evaluating potential objections to corporate
directors’ pursuit of goals beyond shareholder wealth maximization).
54
Id. at 440–42.
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such questions should force a discussion of what the possible effects of
corporate and/or investment conduct are, and hopefully of proper methods
of evaluating and responding to those effects. The “public” effects of
business activities must be identified in order to determine where the costs
of any social harms should be allocated. For example, if a company
pollutes the environment, the cost must be recognized before it can be
assigned or reassigned.55 Similarly, if investment decisions have public
effects, the costs of bad decisions must be recognized before they can be
assigned or reassigned, or ideally, before policies can be adopted to reduce
their likelihood in the first place.56
Business and securities law scholars writing about publicness have
generally not allowed the term to encompass so much. Rather, scholars
including Professors Langevoort and Thompson have focused on the
proper determination of when a company should be classified as public,
meaning that the corporation should be subject to the greater disclosure
requirements imposed by federal law.57 Policy and technology changes that
permit companies to access capital without offering shares through a public
offering make efforts to police the border between public and private, as
the terms have been used in the securities law context, more difficult and
perhaps less relevant. At the same time, the traditional regulatory regime
classifying companies does not distinguish on the basis of “societal
footprint”58—a concept that is consistent with the much broader notion of
what it means to be public, that this Article argues for, and that Professors
Langevoort and Thompson treat as relevant to the determination of when
greater disclosure requirements should be imposed.59
Others have characterized greater regulation of corporate conduct as
extending the reach of the regulatory regime applicable to companies. In
this view, greater publicness is the analogue of privatization: when
corporate decision-making is subject to greater regulatory and legislative
constraints, the shift constitutes an extension of public power into a

55
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation of International
Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 258 (1995) (discussing analysis of the failure to
impose costs of environmental harm on consumers and producers in order to reduce such harm).
56
See, e.g., David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106,
2168–69 (2014) (arguing that fiduciary duties of officers and directors, properly understood, should
preclude pension funds from making investments that could lead to loss of beneficiaries’ jobs).
57
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29, at 341.
58
Id. at 342.
59
This Article, in contrast, argues that what Professors Langevoort and Thompson might view as
the societal footprint should both encompass the purpose for which a private entity acts and potentially
justify the imposition of constraints on that entity’s conduct. The requirements this Article suggests
could be imposed on institutional investors, for example, go well beyond imposition of reporting
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
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previously private sphere. The removal of officer and director discretion
by legislative fiat was the response to scandals involving corporate
conduct, after the financial accounting scandals in 2001–2002: Congress
imposed requirements on public company boards, mandating that members
of the auditing committee be independent, for example.61 After the
financial crisis of 2008, lawmakers imposed the requirement that
companies seize, or claw back, payments made to executives on the basis
of corporate financial performance based on spurious data.62 In each case,
the government removed corporate officers’ and directors’ discretion.
Scholars who have focused on corporate governance have addressed
the question of the extent to which stakeholders other than shareholders
should weigh in on decision-making by corporate officers and directors.63
Professor Lynn A. Stout has persuasively argued that one rationale for the
power of corporate boards relative to shareholders is enabling the
corporation to serve multiple constituencies, beyond holders of its stock, in
order to serve best the needs of the entity.64 Professor Stout argues that
more than investment by shareholders is necessary to make a corporation
succeed, noting that creditors must have faith in corporate decisionmaking, as must employees, vendors, and customers.65 Shareholders in
myopic pursuit of short-run profit might well indulge in choices that would
disserve necessary constituencies. From a broader perspective,
shareholders might oppose—and in one venerable and widely taught case,
they did oppose—corporate philanthropy.66 Acknowledging that the
interests of various public corporation stakeholders should be weighed
when evaluating corporate governance regimes is only a small step from
acknowledging that achievement of public missions should also factor in
analysis and regulation of corporate conduct.
Professor Lisa M. Fairfax addresses precisely the question of the
authority of corporate directors to act on the basis of concerns about
constituents other than shareholders, and concludes that corporate law does

60
See Sale, supra note 43, at 1019 (distinguishing between the indirect government influence of
the past and the mandatory duties and decision-making responsibilities imposed on corporate officers
and directors by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
61
See 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012).
62
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (2012).
63
See, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 668–69 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical
Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PENN. L. REV.
667, 680–81 (2003).
64
Stout, supra note 63, at 680.
65
See id. at 680–84 (developing an example of how corporate stakeholders other than
shareholders might behave in the presence and absence of constraints on shareholder conduct).
66
See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (holding that a shareholder
could not challenge a philanthropic donation by corporation to Princeton University).
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afford them the flexibility to do so. Her analysis may assuage critics
philosophically opposed to privatization, who argue that the public mission
of privatized businesses will be compromised by the pursuit of profit.68
While Professor Fairfax’s question of whether profit maximization can be
consistent with achievement of public goals is related to the argument of
this Article, her focus was on the possibility that the interests of
shareholders and the public might diverge.69 This Article is motivated by
concern that institutional investors serving public goals might make
mistakes.
There are profound ramifications to recognition that ostensibly forprofit legal entities like corporations can and do serve missions properly
conceived of as public.70 This Article of necessity seeks only to highlight
the challenge created by the continued blurring of the line dividing public
from private. The discussion that follows analyzes the implications and
offers a policy response in just one area, involving the availability of the
private offering exemption to disclosure requirements imposed by federal
law on public offerings of securities. But the focus of the Article is not
meant to suggest that the implications of adopting a broader definition of
publicness do not extend much further.
III. PRIVATE OFFERINGS: THE FRAMEWORK AND ITS PROBLEMS
The federal securities laws adopted in the wake of the market crash of
1929 focused primarily on the protection of investors. However,
lawmakers and, subsequently, courts have long accepted that not all
investors are equally in need of assistance.71 Certain investors, those
perceived as having the ability to protect themselves, may purchase
securities that have not been registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC); the registration requirement is deemed unnecessary.
This exemption regime, classifying investors based on wealth, limits
participation in potentially riskier transactions only to the extent that the
presumption that investor wealth correlates with sophistication holds true.72
67
See Fairfax, supra note 49, at 473–74 (concluding that because the flexibility and
permissiveness of corporate law allows directors the freedom to pursue the interests of nonshareholders, the social entity conception of the corporation has taken precedence over the shareholder
primacy model).
68
See id. at 428 & n.93.
69
See id. at 429–30.
70
For example, insurance companies, whose policies benefit third parties, invest in order to help
fund their operations. To the extent that the availability of policies to beneficiaries is a public goal,
enhanced regulation of insurer investment activity could be consistent with the arguments made in this
Article about public pension funds. However, such a proposal is beyond this Article’s scope.
71
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953) (“An offering to those who are shown
to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’”).
72
The problem of the unsophisticated but wealthy person is addressed in colorful fashion in a
student note describing, among other things, how the regulations would treat the heiress Paris Hilton.
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This Part summarizes the different exceptions to the general requirement
that securities be registered, analyzes criticisms of the exemption regime,
and explains why its shortcomings matter.
A. When Securities Need Not Be Registered
Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits sale of a security unless that
security is registered with the SEC.73 However, issuers may sell securities
that have not been registered pursuant to one of several possible
exemptions, or “safe harbors.” Private offerings typically take advantage of
exemptions described in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, the rules under
Regulation D (the most important of which draws its authority from
Section 4(2)),74 Rule 144A,75 and Regulation S.76 Each exemption regime
is described in brief below.
1. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts from the registration
requirement of Section 5 any transaction “by an issuer not involving any
public offering.”77 Thus, an issuer can sell an unregistered security to a
buyer, so long as the sale does not constitute a public offering. The
Supreme Court has reasoned that if the rationale for the Securities Act’s
registration requirement generally is “protect[ion] of investors by
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed
investment decisions,” then the “natural” justification of the exemption is
that the participants are investors “who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves.”78
Lower courts attempting to discern whether a securities transaction
constitutes a public offering have focused on aspects of the offering
including the number of offerees, their relationship to each other and the
issuer, the number of units (such as shares) offered, the manner in which
they were offered, and the sophistication of the offerees.79 The more people
to whom the security is offered, the greater the number of securities sold,
Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor”
Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 733 (2009).
73
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(2012)).
74
Id. § 4(2), 48 Stat. at 77.
75
17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2014).
76
Id. §§ 230.901–.905.
77
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 48 Stat. at 77.
78
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953). Interestingly, in this oft-quoted case,
the Court implied that an evaluation of a potential purchaser’s need for protection turned not on
characteristics of that investor, but on the nature of the information provided by the seller. Id. at 127.
79
SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. Corp., 545
F.2d 893, 905 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying a slightly different set of factors).
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the more broadly accessible the transaction is (i.e., the more widely
distributed the issuer-disseminated information about the transaction), and
the less sophisticated the potential purchasers, the more likely the
transaction is to be deemed public and consequently not eligible for the
exemption. Cases generally do not, however, explore the rationale for
presumption of sophistication in more detail than the Supreme Court did
initially, nor do they ponder whether there are other reasons beyond the
statutory text to permit or deny an investor from participating in a private
offering.
2. Regulation D: Rules 504, 505, and 506
Regulation D, through three implementing rules, provides other oftenused paths around registration. Rule 504, which draws on authority granted
by Section 3 of the Securities Act,80 exempts sales of securities by issuers
offering and selling securities worth no more than $1 million in a twelvemonth period.81 Rule 505, which also draws on Section 3, exempts sales of
securities provided that the aggregate offering price does not exceed $5
million.82 Rule 506, which draws its authority from Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act,83 imposes no limit on the amount of money that can be
raised through a private offering, but does limit the offering to “accredited
investors” and no more than thirty-five sophisticated investors that are not
accredited.84 Because it does not include a dollar limit, Rule 506 is
particularly appealing to issuers.
The exemptions do not mean that issuers are free of any obligation to
provide information to any prospective investor. In fact, issuers are
required to provide information like that required in a registration
statement, with a level of detail that increases as the value of the offering
rises, to investors that are not accredited.85 The securities sold through any
of these safe harbors are “restricted,” meaning that resale by the purchaser
is prohibited unless the security is registered or the subsequent transaction
is independently exempt from registration requirements.86
Accredited investors, according to Section 3(a) of the Securities Act,
80
Section 3(b) permits the SEC to use its regulatory power to add to the Act’s list of exempt
securities “by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering.”
However, no issue may be exempt if the aggregate amount of securities offered is greater than $5
million. Id.
81
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014). The exemption is limited to issuers that are not subject to reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that are not investment companies, and that are
not “development stage compan[ies]” that do not have a specific business plan or that have a business
plan “to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies.” Id.
82
Id. § 230.505.
83
See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the scope of Section 4(2)).
84
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014).
85
Id. § 230.502(b).
86
See infra Part III.A.3 (describing regulations limiting resale of unregistered securities).
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include banks, savings and loan associations, investment companies,
executives of the issuer, individuals whose net worth exceeds $1 million or
whose income exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or
trusts and state benefit plans with assets of more than $5 million.87 A
sophisticated investor “has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment.”88 These clear and concrete criteria have the
benefit of easy administration, but presume a correlation between ability
and wealth.
Sellers serving these accredited and/or sophisticated investors avoid a
regulatory burden; buyers in turn are expected to be sufficiently savvy to
ask for disclosure of the information they deem relevant to making their
investment decision. Use of quantifiable investor characteristics has the
advantage of simple application, because determining wealth or corporate
form is relatively straightforward, but this Article argues that these criteria
are not up to the task.
3. Rules 144 and 144A
The above exemptions apply to initial offerings of securities made by
an issuer to buyers participating in a private offering.89 Separate
restrictions and exemptions apply to resale of securities initially purchased
by accredited or sophisticated investors.90 This complementary regime
prevents initial purchasers from serving as conduits for the sale of
securities on public secondary markets, such as stock exchanges. Under
Rule 144, securities acquired in a transaction that did not involve a public
offering may not be resold for six months if the issuer is a publicly traded
company and for one year if the issuer is not a publicly traded company.91
Even after this holding period has expired, such “restricted securities”92
may not be sold to the general public unless specific, additional

87
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2014). The list above is not exhaustive. In calculating the net worth of
an individual investor, the rule requires exclusion of the value of that individual’s residence. Id.
§ 230.501(a)(5).
88
Id. § 230.506(b)(ii).
89
Id. § 230.506(a).
90
Id. § 230.144A(d)(1).
91
Id. § 230.144(d)(1). The shorter restriction applies if the issuer has been subject to the periodic
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act for at least ninety days prior to the initial sale; the longer
restriction applies if the issuer has not been subject to the reporting requirements for at least ninety days
prior to the sale. Id. The intuition is, if the issuer discloses financial information in its periodic reports,
then the potential buyer of the restricted securities is more likely to be able to evaluate the value and
riskiness of the securities.
92
Id. § 230.144(a)(3).
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requirements have been met.
Rule 144A provides an exemption for sales of restricted securities
“acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer, or from an affiliate of the
issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public
offering.”94 The holder of such securities may sell to a “qualified
institutional buyer” (QIB), a category which is not the same as an
accredited investor.95 QIBs include insurance companies, investment
companies, and employee benefit plans, provided that the entity “owns and
invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers
that are not affiliated with the entity.”96 Because of this asset requirement,
QIBs invariably are accredited investors, but the converse is not true.
Like the standards applicable to accredited investors, the QIB
requirements are easy to apply, focused as they are on a relatively
straightforward valuation of an institutional investor’s assets. The QIB
requirements differ in that a presumption of sophistication based on control
of $100 million of securities may seem safer than a presumption based on
the wealth thresholds applicable to accredited investors; the QIB
requirement is more likely to narrow the field to investors that have
significant investment experience.97
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the SEC modified Rule 506
and Rule 144A in 2013 to implement a provision of legislation intended to
bolster economic growth.98 The changes permit an issuer of securities
through a private placement or a seller of securities purchased through a
private placement, respectively, to engage in general advertising and
general solicitation of potential purchasers, provided that purchasers are
accredited investors and that the other requirements of the rule are met.99
The amendment did not change the method of classifying investors as
“accredited,” nor did it include criteria for determining definitively
whether a non-accredited investor was sufficiently sophisticated to
participate. However, the amendment did provide guidance to issuers or
sellers trying to take advantage of the safe harbor, to help avoid reaching

93
Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm [http://perma.cc/HK4F-JNXJ] (last visited Nov. 29,
2015).
94
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3).
95
Id. § 230.144A.
96
Id. § 230.144A(a)(i). This list is a subset, not a comprehensive list, of the entities that qualify as
QIBs.
97
The rationale behind the $100 million requirement, as opposed to $50 million, for example, is
unclear. Either way, the requirement clearly would exclude far more investors than the accredited
investor criteria do.
98
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313–14
(2012) (mandating SEC action).
99
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(c)(2)(ii), 230.144A(d)(1) (2014).
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an erroneous conclusion that a purchaser was accredited. These criteria
are relevant for this Article because they describe various ways that a seller
can safely evaluate buyer sophistication.
The amended rule suggests that an issuer seeking to verify that a
potential purchaser is an accredited investor consult Internal Revenue
Service forms showing income,101 bank statements, reports of credit rating
agencies, or written statements from brokers, investment advisers, lawyers,
or accountants who have worked with the investor.102 Unfortunately, these
criteria103 do not signal a shift away from simple, mechanical tests
measuring easily observable investor characteristics that may be unreliable
proxies for sophistication. The amended rule still relies on measures of net
worth, rather than some evaluation of investor experience, skill, or
resilience, as advocated in this Article. This persistent reliance on assets as
an indicator of ability represents a dangerous continuation of an outdated
mode of thinking about investors, as demonstrated in Part IV below.
4. Regulation S: Rules 901–905
Under Regulation S, offerings and sales of securities outside the
United States are not subject to the registration requirements of Section 5
of the Securities Act.104 The rule provides safe harbors for offers and sales
of securities in specific transactions, all subject to two general conditions:
(1) the offer and sale must occur in an “offshore transaction,”105 meaning
that either the seller believes the buyer is offshore when the sale is
consummated, or that the sale takes place on one of several, specifically
identified offshore exchanges; and (2) the offer and sale are not the subject
of “directed selling efforts,” defined as “any activity undertaken for the
purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have the effect of,
conditioning the market in the United States for any of the securities being
offered in reliance on . . . Regulation S.”106 In this context, “conditioning
the market” refers to efforts to drum up interest in the offering and sales
opportunity by, for example, mailing materials to potential investors.107
Because the eligibility for this exemption from the registration
100

Id.
The issuer is also advised to procure a statement from the purchaser indicating that the
purchaser anticipates future income sufficient to qualify as an accredited investor in the current year.
Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A).
102
Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(B)–(C).
103
The SEC is careful not to require consideration of any or all of the factors listed in the
amended rule; the methods listed “are examples of the types of non-exclusive and non-mandatory
methods that satisfy the verification requirement.” Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(D).
104
Id. § 230.901.
105
Id. § 230.903(a)(1).
106
Id. § 230.902(c).
107
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 221–23 (5th ed.
2004).
101
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requirements of the Securities Act does not turn on investor characteristics
but on geography, this Article will not spend more time evaluating it.
B. Concerns over Private Offerings
Private offerings represent a fast-growing share of securities offerings.
In recent years, the amount of capital raised by private offerings of
securities has exceeded the amount raised through public offerings: in
2010, according to one study, offerings of public company stock raised
slightly more than $200 billion, while the value of securities sold through
private offerings was about four times greater.108 The bulk of losses
suffered by pension funds in the wake of the financial crisis were the result
of declines in stock prices,109 but securities purchased in private offerings
resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, including losses to
public pension funds estimated at one point to exceed 25% of total assets
between 2007 and early 2009.110 Blame for the declines in asset values
cannot be laid entirely or even mostly on investments in “alternative
investments” including hedge funds and private equity. But one report
estimated that these investments accounted for 7% of total assets in a
typical pension portfolio, so they do bear some responsibility.111 From
October 2007 through March 2009, declines in the value of these
investments accounted for a decline in total asset value of slightly less than
2%.112 In contrast, declines in stock prices, bonds, and loans, which
combined accounted for 85% of the typical pension portfolio, resulted in a
34% decline in asset value.113 Improving financial markets in subsequent
years may have helped pension funds recover some of that asset value, but
that is not the end of the issue; pension funds need not only to avoid losses
but also to grow in order to keep up with rising costs.114 Consequently, the
shortcomings of the exemption regime matter and will matter more as
pension funds purchase more of these alternative investments. This Part
provides a critique of that regime.
Investor decisions in the years leading up to the financial crisis of
108
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION 3 fig.3 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/
info/smallbus/acsec/acsec103111_analysis-reg-d-offering.pdf [http://perma.cc/2X6N-5RCN].
109
DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INST., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS’ EFFECTS ON THE
ALTERNATIVES FOR PUBLIC PENSIONS 2 (2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
papers/2010/4/20-public-pensions-elliott/0420_public_pensions_elliott.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8GRUGWX2].
110
Id. at 1.
111
Id. at 2 tbl.1.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 2 (“The public pension funds may have lost 15% over two years on a ‘nominal’ basis,
but, if their target return was 8% a year, they lost 31% compared to their targeted level of investment
value, excluding the effects of contributions and pension payments.” (footnote omitted)).
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2008 call into question the presumption that wealth correlates with
sophistication.116 Sizable institutional investors often purchased securities
in private offerings and in many cases did not take appropriate or adequate
steps to protect themselves.117 Indeed, the crisis revealed just how many
institutions previously considered astute navigators of financial markets
were in fact capable of remarkably poor judgments.118 According to the
report of the commission tasked by Congress with identifying the causes of
the crisis, purchasers of doomed mortgage-linked securities119 who were
“qualified institutional buyer[s]” under SEC rules120 “included investors as
diverse as insurance companies like MetLife, pension funds like the
115
Investor decisions a decade earlier, during the technology bubble that led into the new
millennium, also raise questions.
116
Government investigations into investments by public pension funds in alternative investments
have found shortcomings in institutions’ procedures and recommended that the government provide
guidance for future transactions with private equity and hedge funds. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HIGHLIGHT CHALLENGES OF
HEDGE FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING 9, 15–17 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/5886
23.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VX2-BGUA] (finding that while most of the fund executives interviewed
expressed satisfaction with the performance of their alternative investments, they also described
challenges in the form of illiquid investments, limited transparency, and adverse effects of co-investors’
withdrawals). Public pension funds with tens of millions of dollars to invest may suffer losses on
transactions into which they were enticed by misconduct, as well. See, e.g., SEC Charges ManhattanBased Private Equity Manager with Stealing $9 Million in Investor Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM’N (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540703682
#.VMKxg8aOKgc [http://perma.cc/8ESR-W5RU] (describing the SEC’s complaint against a private
equity fund manager who essentially used for improper purposes funds invested by pensions and other
investors); SEC Charges Private Equity Firm and Money Manager for Defrauding Detroit-Area Public
Pension Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010/lr21500.htm [http://perma.cc/4JL6-NHT8] (describing a complaint by the SEC that
alleged deception of three public pension funds in Michigan).
117
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, created by Congress to look into the causes of the
financial crisis that began in 2008, concluded that “financial institutions made, bought, and sold
mortgage securities they never examined, did not care to examine, or knew to be defective.” NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT xvii (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/CTK8-XA9X].
118
See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 29, at 362–63 (examining how institutional buyers
willingly purchased so much risk).
119
FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 169–70. Specifically at issue were collateralized debt
obligations, or CDOs, which are securities whose value depends on the performance of a bundle of
home loans.
120
While Regulation D applied to sales of securities by the issuer, sales of collateralized debt
obligations implicated in the financial crisis often were subject to Rule 144A. Id. at 170. This
regulation permits sales of certain securities to “qualified institutional buyers.” Id. Various types of
entities, such as investment companies, insurance companies, small business investment companies,
employee benefit plans, and trust funds, can be QIBs, provided that they “in the aggregate own[] and
invest[] on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with
the [investing] entity.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i) (2014). Rule 144A applies to resale of existing
securities. FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 170. The advantage of 144A transactions is exemption
from SEC registration requirements; these transactions were not considered public offerings. Id.
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California State Teachers’ Retirement System, and investment banks like
Goldman Sachs.”121
Even municipalities with tens of millions of dollars to invest might not
properly investigate a transaction before entering it.122 Financial
companies, despite decades of experience selling insurance against all
manner of catastrophes, might fail to prepare for the possibility that they
might have to pay on guarantees of complex financial transactions.123
Companies whose job it is to evaluate the worth of complex securities
might fail, for whatever reason, to do so.124 The failure to study an
investment adequately ahead of time may have been the result either of an
influx of investors inexperienced in the world of asset-backed securities, of
weak incentives to avoid risk, or of inadequate internal controls within
investing institutions. Whatever the cause, the result was investment in
securities tied in various ways to real-estate debt by buyers whose wealth
suggested sophistication but whose conduct revealed a dangerous
combination of arrogance, greed, recklessness, and, above all, naiveté.125
If investors that meet the regulatory requirements do not in fact have
the capacity to evaluate the riskiness of transactions ahead of time or the
resources to withstand losses if adverse risks materialize, then the
exemption regime is not an effective screening device. The current
structure, based on eighty-five-year-old beliefs about investor
sophistication and wealth, does not take into account what history has
made evident: investors who satisfy the criteria often do not deserve the
presumption.126 The exemption regime does not screen institutions that,
though they manage large amounts of money, may not be sophisticated.
Nor does the regulatory regime effectively screen investors that do not take
advantage of their capacity to evaluate a deal even though they have it.
Scholars have begun to investigate how investment decisions are made
in an institutional setting, in part to understand how mistakes happen. They
have identified factors, from compensation structures to group dynamics to
121

FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 170 (footnote omitted).
E.g., Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 441, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (illustrating one example of insufficient pre-investment research in a case in which Norwegian
municipalities alleged common-law fraud and violations of federal securities laws after investing
disastrously in notes sold by the defendants).
123
E.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 140–41 (outlining a lead example of this lack of
preparation in AIG’s credit default swap business prior to the 2008 crisis).
124
Id. at 212.
125
Id. at xvii.
126
Given the relatively small amount of money an individual must have in order to qualify as an
accredited investor, it is correspondingly likely that an individual investor that barely satisfies the
requirement lacks the resources to perform due diligence on a complex securities transaction. The less
wealthy an individual investor, of course, the more likely that investor is to invest through an
intermediary, and the less likely it is that the investor would be approached by a seller offering a
complex security through private offering.
122
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heuristics relied upon by individual executives, that may get in the way of
sophisticated conduct.127 Institutions, like individuals, are subject to
pressures and biases that may result in poor investment decisions and/or
poor implementation of investment decisions. Institutions may not conduct
thorough due diligence on securities, for example, when executives leading
them are motivated by a desire to keep up with rivals buying the same
instruments. These findings matter because institutional investors have
come to dominate securities markets;128 fewer individual investors
purchase securities directly at the retail level.129
The regulatory regime that classifies investors as sophisticated also
fails to take into account the increasingly complex securities bought and
sold on financial markets. Transactions have become harder to classify,
with private offerings that function like public offerings130and public
company stock sales that look like private placements.131 As financial
instruments have become more intricate, understanding their structure and
potential effects has grown more difficult; sellers of securities implicated
in the financial crisis of 2008 commented dismissively time and again on
the ability of purchasers to figure out what they were buying.132 Yet the
regulations defining accredited investors do not take into account the
difficulty of understanding the consequences of a particular investment and
do not, for example, specify some level of expertise buyers must
demonstrate, let alone require them to weigh the potential effects of poor
decisions.
Institutional relationships are also increasingly complex, with
intermediaries investing in private offerings directly, or in hedge funds or
127
See Steven M. Davidoff & Caire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599,
610 (2013); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in
Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 818
(2010).
128
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Institutional Investors: Power and
Responsibility, Remarks at Georgia State University (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808 [http://perma.cc/FFN6-AKW2] (“[T]he proportion of U.S.
public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8%
of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67% in 2010.”).
129
Davidoff, supra note 22, at 340 (identifying “the trend of investment intermediation and
deretailization” as a significant development in the new capital market).
130
For example, Goldman Sachs’ pre-public-offering investment of $500 million in Facebook.
Susanne Craig & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Goldman Offering Clients a Chance to Invest in Facebook,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/goldman-invests-infacebook-at-50-billion-valuation/.
131
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 211, 220 (2009).
132
E.g., Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(describing an e-mail in which a Goldman-Sachs’ employee laments a client’s ability to understand a
transaction); FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 235–36 (describing efforts by a Goldman Sachs’ vice
president to encourage sales of securities to buyers other than “sophisticated hedge funds”).
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private equity funds on behalf of retail savers, such as workers trying to
prepare for retirement.133 Such investment patterns make regulating
investor conduct more difficult; investors can do indirectly what they
cannot do directly. Prohibitions in such a market will not prevent
misconduct, they will simply force innovation.134 These relationships
among institutions, for example between pension funds and hedge funds in
which they invest,135 also serve to blur the distinction between entities
classified as public for securities law purposes and those classified as
private.136 Hedge funds and private equity funds are major players on
public exchanges and, more importantly for this Article, institutions
serving the unsophisticated public increasingly invest in private offerings
and in hedge funds and private equity funds that invest in private
offerings.137 Private offerings by definition do not face the same disclosure
requirements as public offerings, thereby limiting the SEC’s ability to
monitor.
Nor does the exemption regime take into account more intangible
characteristics that suggest sophistication. There are other ways investors
are classified, informally but significantly. The decisions of some investors
have powerful effects on financial markets, even if the size of the
investment is modest for that investor; when the legendary investor Warren
Buffett put $5 billion into Goldman Sachs early in the fall of 2008, his
move was reassuring to financial markets.138 Buffett’s influence is certainly
related to his wealth, but that alone does not (and should not) account for
the respect given him. He is also a longtime investor who has made astute
choices over time, and investors who are repeat players, who conduct
133

Davidoff, supra note 22, at 352.
See id. at 355 (pointing out the delay between the comparatively slow regulatory process’
response to investors’ adaptation to new regulations).
135
The nation’s largest public pension funds hold slightly more than fifteen percent of their assets
in “alternative” investments that primarily consist of private equity and hedge funds. Summary of
Findings for FY 2013, PUB. FUND SURV. (Jan. 2015), http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/publicfund
survey/summaryoffindings.html [http://perma.cc/F99X-GVS8]. The Public Fund Survey reflects data
on state and local government retirement systems overseeing $2.86 trillion. Id. Public pension funds
hold more than $4 trillion in assets. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n,
Evaluating Pension Fund Investments Through the Lens of Good Corporate Governance, Remarks at
the Hispanic Heritage Foundation’s Latinos on Fast Track Investors Forum (June 27, 2014), http://
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542193403#_edn1 [http://perma.cc/8DTW-86Z5].
136
Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Rethinking
the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 76 (2012).
137
See supra note 135 (describing the extent of public pension fund investment in alternative
investments, including private equity and hedge funds); see also Steve Eder et al., Pensions Leap Back
to Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230365
4804576347762838825864 (reporting on public pension funds’ shift to private equity and hedge fund
investments a few years after the 2008 financial crisis).
138
See Andew Bary, Warren Buffett Makes an Offer Goldman Sachs Can’t Refuse, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122256922970483051.
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similar transactions repeatedly, have more expertise than those whose
transactions are more sporadic or varied. The more prestige, for want of a
better word, the investor amasses and the longer that investor’s track
record of success, the more likely it is that the investor has access to
transactions unavailable to other market participants. Of course, prestige
presents certain challenges to quantification.
Courts have at times noted the significance of the quality of advisers to
investors. Large investors entering significant and complex transactions
retain Wall Street law firms to counsel them on legal risks of a transaction,
investment bankers to help structure and finance it, accounting firms to
help verify asset values, and possibly even media advisers to shape the
appearance of a deal to other investors, the news media, lawmakers, and
regulators.139 One proposed reform would impose on broker-dealers
stronger obligations to evaluate how appropriate an investment, including a
private offering, would be in the context of the buyer’s current portfolio,
thereby putting on the broker-dealer the burden of deciding whether a
transaction is suitable for that investor.140 A now-classic article describing
courts’ inconsistent evaluations of investor sophistication offers a
theoretical framework for determining when sophistication should matter,
and provides a list of investor characteristics that should figure in courts’
evaluations.141
In a provocative article, Professor Stephen Choi proposes using a test
to sort investors more directly.142 The test would require a would-be
investor to demonstrate knowledge of the “function of different market
participants, the risks they pose, and available investor protections.”143
Performance on the test would enable an investor to participate in
139
Given their financial resources, such investors are likely to have access to sophisticated
representation, should they choose to pursue recovery through litigation when a transaction is
unsatisfactory. See Vijay Sekhon, Can the Rich Fend for Themselves?: Inconsistent Treatment of
Wealthy Investors Under the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010, 7 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2011).
140
Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 314 (1994). The underlying concern
expressed in the article is the risk of fraud against wealthy, unsophisticated individual investors, rather
than the systemic risk posed by wealthy, unsophisticated financial entities. Id. at 317.
141
See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988
DUKE L.J. 1081, 1137–47 (1988) (describing five principles that should guide courts deciding when to
take into account investor sophistication); id. at 1149–54 (providing an appendix listing investor
characteristics potentially relevant to the assessment of sophistication). The list includes pragmatic and
direct criteria such as investment experience, professional status, history of speculative investments,
government or business experience, professional experience in the securities industry, as well as
potentially more subjective criteria, such as education, intelligence, age and, indeed, wealth and
income. Id.
142
Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
279, 311 (2000).
143
Id.

2015]

PRIVATE OFFERINGS AND PUBLIC ENDS

381

transactions subject to more or less mandatory disclosure: the most
sophisticated investors could invest in a private offering because such
investors would be deemed capable of protecting themselves, while the
least sophisticated investors would be limited to investing in intermediary
institutions that possessed greater financial expertise.144 The advantage of
such a regime, were it mandatory,145 is its focus on actual investor
knowledge directly, not via a proxy like wealth. The disadvantage is the
need to design tests, which take time to develop, and would inevitably be
imperfect and could produce false positive and false negative results, as
Professor Choi notes.146 And while a more direct regulatory scheme is
appealing, it would not eliminate an investor’s incentive to take on
excessive risk in pursuit of returns needed to meet its other financial
obligations,147 nor solve the problems of mistake or misconduct.
Even investors with great expertise make mistakes or suffer lapses in
judgment, choosing to jump on bandwagons in a doomed caravan, as did
buyers of mortgage-linked securities in the years leading up to the 2008
financial crisis.148 Prior to the crisis, too many investors, even large,
putatively sophisticated financial institutions, engaged in transactions, the
outcomes of which contributed to systemic risk that undermined their
ability to perform their public missions of, for example, funding workers’
retirements.149 These developments, which make concerns about growth in
private placements150 more significant, postdate much151 of the scholarship
analyzing and criticizing the classification regime permitting participation

144

Id.
Professor Choi considers mandatory, voluntary, and hybrid licensing schemes in his article. Id.
at 310–19.
146
Id. at 312–13. More recently, the Investor Advisory Committee to the SEC, created by the
Dodd-Frank Act, has recommended that the Commission consider adopting a test as one way to screen
the sophisticated from the less so. RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE:
ACCREDITED INVESTOR DEFINITION 6–7 (2014) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR
ADVISORY COMMITTEE], http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/investmentadvisor-accredited-definition.pdf [http://perma.cc/SRW6-JYFJ].
147
For example, a public pension fund’s obligations to pay benefits.
148
Which, to be clear and to be fair, occurred eight years after the publication of Professor Choi’s
article. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 18 (reporting the sale of $1.3 trillion of mortgage-backed
securities from the third-quarter of 2006 to the height of the 2008 financial crisis).
149
At least one post-crisis article has addressed the treatment of sophisticated investors. See Cary
Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Rethinking the
Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 76 (2012). Professor
Martin argues that “prominent institutions that qualify as sophisticated investors have indirectly
exposed retail investors to unregulated investment schemes” because retail investors have entrusted
their savings to the institutions and the institutions have in turn invested in private placements. Id.
Professor Martin calls for greater disclosure by hedge funds, for example, to institutional investors
serving retail workers, as well as for consolidation of regulatory agencies. Id. at 107–11.
150
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
151
But see supra note 149.
145
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in private placements.
Developing an effective classification regime to identify investors
capable of participating in private placements should be part of any effort
to prevent a repeat of the investment patterns that led to the crisis. Even if
private offerings are made accessible to more investors, as at least one
scholar has proposed,153 the characteristics of those investors should
determine the nature and extent of such access. Some will require greater
protection and others less.
Nevertheless, screening alone will not avoid future calamity.154
Ensuring that those individuals and entities investing in private placements
have the true wherewithal to do so—that is, both the ability to evaluate the
investment beforehand and to manage adverse outcomes should they
materialize—would reduce risk to the financial system and to financial
institutions, as well as to individual workers who rely on institutions155 to
manage their money to fund retirement or education.
Because these transactions take place off exchanges and may involve
parties unfamiliar with their counterparties and/or buyers without mastery
of the nuances of the transaction, there is room for efficiency enhancement
by clarifying the capabilities of participants. Those costs now are borne by
buyers that do not have adequate information or ability to analyze and
manage information needed to evaluate a transaction, and that allocation
may be less than ideal. If buyers know that the counterparties they deal
with must meet meaningful and relevant criteria in order to invest in a
transaction, that knowledge should reduce costs and facilitate
consummation of the deal.156 Failure to adopt a more sophisticated
classification regime preserves the risk that too many investors without
appropriate resources will buy into transactions too complex or risky for
them to handle, with possible collateral consequences extending well
152

See infra Part IV.A (discussing improved measures of investor sophistication).
Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3393–94
(2013). Unlike Professor Rodrigues, I view the financial crisis as an indicator that too many investors
already had—and have—access to private transactions and that such access should be restricted.
154
As Professor Smith points out in the context of the Bernie Madoff scandal, sophistication alone
does not ensure diligence or caution. Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the
Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 255–56 (2010).
155
For example, public pension funds with increasing frequency invest in private transactions.
The California Public Employee Retirement System, CalPERS, invested $32 billion, or about ten
percent of its portfolio, in private equity as of June 30, 2014. CALPERS, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT 28 (2014), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/cafr-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LA6U-NW5U]. Some of those private equity entities may in turn invest in publicly
traded securities.
156
This is an important point because tightening the criteria accredited investors must meet may
at first sound like a highly paternalistic move. But the goal is not to put a stop to private placements—
far from it. The goal is to ensure that these transactions take place among investors with the expertise to
participate in them, without creating excess risk to other market participants or the functioning of
markets themselves.
153
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beyond the parties involved. In the next Part, this Article offers proposals
for reform.
IV. REFORMING THE REGISTRATION EXEMPTION REGIME
The regime that relies on investor wealth to determine who may
participate in private offerings has evident flaws, in that it approves such
participation by individuals and institutions without adequate means of
evaluating risk or coping with adverse outcomes. As suggested by some of
the critics whose views were discussed above,157 wealth and/or income
may be poor proxies for ability, resources, or experience. This Part first
develops an alternative regime that would attempt to capture investor
sophistication directly, rather than indirectly, using other investor
characteristics. Then, significantly, this Part contends that even an
improved measure of investor ability should be subordinated to
consideration of the purpose of the investment, on the theory that some
investments are too important to be put at risk because they serve critical,
public ends. To illustrate how the proposed policy might work in practice,
this Part then returns to the case of SDCERA and illustrates how the
proposal would have applied to that public pension fund.
The proposal is an outline only; there are critical points that should be
subject to debate. For example, what kind of risk tolerance should
institutions with public missions have? Can a federal entity like the SEC
impose limits on the investor conduct of state public pension funds, in the
context of the U.S. federal structure? This Article seeks to encourage
debate over questions like these.
A. Investor Characteristics that Better Measure “Sophistication”
A tradeoff exists between classification of investors as sophisticated—
or accredited, for that matter—based on wealth and/or income, on the one
hand, and on other, less simply quantified characteristics, as it is far easier
to collect data on wealth and income. A middle ground, based on
trustworthy principles, must exist; Professor Choi’s licensing proposal,158
which could require investors seeking to participate in private offerings to
pass a test, offers one model.
While traditional methods of classifying investors may miss
differences relevant to distinguishing those that are sophisticated from
those that merely have significant assets at their disposal, alternative ways
of characterizing market participants exist. As a practical matter, first,
investors could be required to demonstrate their expertise in order to
participate in transactions subject to fewer disclosure requirements. This
157
158

See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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would entail something more than a regulatory presumption in favor of
sophistication if an investor has a certain amount of wealth.159 An investor
seeking to participate in a private placement could be required to
demonstrate sophistication affirmatively by describing participation in
past, similar transactions, for example, or by describing steps taken to
protect against losses on the proposed investment.
The SEC could propose a more nuanced definition of “accredited
investor,” requiring investors to earn the right to be considered
sophisticated by providing evidence that they had acted like sophisticated
investors in the past.160 Such a showing could be bolstered in a variety of
direct and indirect ways, including describing past transactions, for
example, or listing the professional conferences that the institution’s
executives attend.161 Financial institutions would not be classified by their
size162 but by their conduct—adopting a version of Aristotle’s observation
that we are what we repeatedly do.163 Over time, a track record of effective
management of the riskiness of particular transaction types in private
offerings could result in access to more and larger such investments.164 One
consequence might be that fewer institutional investors would purchase
complex securities that are difficult to evaluate. With the benefit of
hindsight, such caution appears to be a good thing, although to executives
at financial institutions going forward, such a regulatory move would be
undesirable.165
159

See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
Existing legislation gives the SEC the authority to define who is an “accredited investor,” to
whom an issuer may sell an unregistered security. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012) (“The term
‘accredited investor’ shall mean . . . any person who, on the basis of such factors as financial
sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under
management qualifies as an accredited investor under rules and regulations which the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission shall prescribe.”).
161
This would adapt some of the criteria identified by Professor Fletcher for application to
institutions rather than individuals. See supra note 141.
162
See supra Part III.A (describing the classification of investing institutions under regulations
implementing the Securities Act).
163
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1746
(Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (“It is well said, then, that it is by
doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without
doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.”).
164
This would be consistent with the recommendations of Professor Fletcher. See Fletcher, supra
note 141, at 1149–53 (listing criteria for evaluating investor sophistication). However, Professor
Fletcher explicitly excludes institutional investors from the reach of his screening regime by asserting
that the presumption of institutional investor sophistication “should be . . . conclusive.” Id. at 1153.
This Article, informed by the financial crisis of 2008, does not endorse this view.
165
A contrary view might be that allowing investors to diversify their holdings by buying
securities in private offerings actually reduces their risk. Professor Kelli A. Alces has argued that a
portfolio containing securities governed by different legal regimes can have this effect. Kelli A. Alces,
Legal Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1977, 1980 (2013). The empirical question that must be
answered, then, is whether investing in private offerings results in more or less overall risk to an
160
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Such an approach would draw implicitly on the insights of the
academic literature analyzing the relative abilities of different kinds of
entities to manipulate complex systems in their favor.166 Companies that
frequently purchase complex securities are more likely to be sophisticated,
for example, and more likely to have accumulated the expertise to protect
themselves from potential deception. Because such investors are more
likely to have purchased such securities in the past, they are more likely to
have experienced a variety of investment outcomes and to have invested in
instruments to avoid potential losses. Repeat players, thus, have a stronger
incentive to develop expertise in determining what a transaction is worth,
the nature and magnitude of financial damage if it turns out poorly, and the
appropriate steps to manage risk.
Pursuing the same goal through a slightly different path, regulations
could focus more precisely on the sources of income earned by a would-be
investor in a private offering. The greater the share of that income that was
generated by investment activity actively managed by the individual or
entity seeking accreditation, the more financially sophisticated that
individual or entity is likely to be. The advantage of this tactic is its
relative simplicity, resting as it does on modest, additional disclosures.
A more demanding screening mechanism for private offerings could
create an incentive to game any approval process in the quest for higher
returns. To weaken the power of this incentive, regulation of participation
in private offerings could attach consequences; such investors, for
example, could be required to waive certain types of claims or even to
waive certain types of arguments in support of claims.167 Disclaimers
investor’s portfolio—in other words, whether investors successfully use private offerings to reduce
losses in other parts of their portfolios. It is not clear that public pension funds in particular have been
so successful. See Roger Lowenstein, How Pensions Make Investing Too Complex, FORTUNE (Nov. 8,
2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/08/how-pensions-make-investing-too-complex/ [http://perma.cc/CC
83-P49R].
166
E.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 113 (1974) (describing the process by which repeat litigators
eventually “enjoy[] strategic advantages” in litigation systems). Works teasing out the implications of
Professor Galanter’s analysis in a variety of systems should also be examined. Compare Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players
in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 30 (1999) (analyzing the ability of “[h]ave-not[]” repeat
players to be successful in the official system of courts in personal-injury actions), with id. at 32 (noting
the many ways repeat players access “alternative justice systems”). Scholars have also approached the
question of manipulation of systems of dispute resolution from other perspectives. E.g., John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2012) (examining how financial
regulatory reform legislation passed by lawmakers in response to financial crises is subsequently
eroded as a result of lobbying by affected industries).
167
At its core, this is an argument for some form of estoppel. Financial institutions that claim they
were misled into purchasing certain assets, but who performed minimal or no due diligence before
investing, should not then be permitted either to issue securities of their own through regulatory
exemptions to registration requirements or to purchase securities sold pursuant to such exemptions.

386

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:355

would create a disincentive to participate in transactions that might be too
exotic for those investors lacking the capacity to evaluate overly complex
securities.168
More subjective investor characteristics should be taken into account
as well. For example, evaluation of internal controls governing investment
activity is already required of public169 companies. Investors with weaker
internal systems of internal controls170 in place to discourage short-sighted
purchases or monitor investment performance might be classified as less
sophisticated, thereby incorporating considerations of corporate
governance into the exemption regulatory regime.
The regulatory moves described above all recognize that financial
market participants exist in a multidimensional space, and may
simultaneously possess characteristics that suggest capacity to undertake a
particular, complex investment safely, and characteristics that suggest an
inability to do so. A more modern classification regime would evaluate
investors in holistic fashion, considering both aptitude in the context of a
particular transaction and past investment experience. Ideally, such a
scheme would limit eligibility to reap the rewards of investing in
potentially more complex securities to those best able to identify and
manage the corresponding risks.
These reform proposals, which would limit access to private offerings,
may raise concerns about excessive paternalism. This is more than an
abstract concern: new, federal restrictions on investment in private
offerings by state pension funds undermine state autonomy. A challenge to
such limits, perhaps undertaken by a pension fund facing a significant
This estoppel would create an incentive for institutional investors to perform more due diligence than
many conducted prior to the 2008 financial crisis and, in cases of those institutions that fail to conduct
adequate due diligence in the future, would help to prevent exposure to future losses that should have
been avoided.
168
There is a normative argument here, of course, that some investors should not participate in
some transactions for the good of all investors. It is difficult to read the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
and not reach the conclusion that harmful effects of the crisis might have been avoided had fewer
entities entangled themselves in deals involving securities, the value of which depended on home loans.
In a provocative article questioning the power of disclosure to prevent poor investment decisions,
Professors Steven M. Davidoff and Claire A. Hill suggest going further than I do. They call “for an
‘unsafe harbor’ under which investors attempting to justify their investment decisions to a court could
not invoke reliance on third-party certification as their sole . . . decisionmaking technique.” Davidoff &
Hill, supra note 127, at 636.
169
Here, I am using the word “public” as a term of art, the narrow sense in which it is used in
securities regulation. See Definition of “Public”, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY,
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public [http://perma.cc/3JN6-6WHB] (last visited Oct. 4, 2015)
(defining public as “capitalized in shares that can be freely traded on the open market”).
170
There is a precedent for evaluation of such systems. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for
example, requires a “registered public accounting firm” to prepare audits and approval of “internal
control[s]” at publicly traded companies. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404(b), 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012)).
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shortfall and seeking to use potentially riskier investments to bolster its
income and meet its financial obligations, would compel development of a
complex and shifting area of law. The outcome of such litigation could
have unexpected effects—perhaps salutary, perhaps not—on the new
private offering limits and on public pension investing practices more
generally.
Perhaps changes in financial markets and the increasingly varied
investor population are not so great a cause for concern. The rise of
institutional investors,171 in particular, means that overall, more investors
should be more experienced and more capable of protecting their own
interests, and that more individual workers and savers should have the
benefit of the expertise of intermediary institutions. Recently, at least one
scholar has argued for greater access to opportunities to invest in private
placements.172 However, fallout from the financial crisis has made clear
that costs of poor investing practices are widely distributed. To limit
participation in more complex and potentially risky transactions is a
second-best solution, but the very nature of investments held by
sophisticated entities makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider,
and possibly an insider, to gauge the potential costs of a mistake. Highly
contingent investments are difficult to value, let alone net against each
other. For example, executives at some of the financial institutions that
proved to be overexposed to falling real estate prices were clearly
unprepared for, and surprised by, the impact of the bursting bubble.173
Taking into account the purpose of investment may provide a means of
limiting the impact of such misjudgments.
B. Investor Purpose: The Publicness Criterion
No selection criteria can prevent all mistakes or eliminate the chance
of losses on investments. The values of securities do not only increase;
transactions can produce losers as well as winners. The question to wrestle
with is: how much should those investment losses be permitted to
undermine a public goal? While measures of experience, expertise, and
resources should all figure in the evaluation of whether an investor should
be permitted to buy potentially riskier securities through private offerings,
an additional criterion should control—the purpose that the investor serves.
171
See Aguilar, supra note 128 (noting the increase in recent decades in the percentage of public
company shares held by institutional investors).
172
See Rodrigues, supra note 153, at 3430–34 (arguing that the general public should be
permitted to participate in the private market using a structure akin to mutual funds).
173
See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html?pagewanted=all
(describing the plight of AIG, which received substantial government support to weather the financial
crisis after its exposure to real estate prices went unnoticed until it was too late).
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To the extent that an investor’s mission is public in nature (meaning that
the investor serves a goal that has greater societal significance and value)
the risk of losses should be limited. The balance of this Part suggests how
the “publicness” of an investor’s mission could be evaluated and what the
regulatory consequences should be.
If investment in private offerings would generate income for third
parties, that would be a step toward publicness. But in many cases, large
investors would respond that they buy both for themselves and for others.
Who the others are must matter. Public pension funds present the easy
case, while an insurance company might present a more difficult one.
Investing on behalf of third parties alone does not confer publicness and
additional questions help to clarify. If the third parties providing money for
the investment are retail-level savers, such as workers who rely on a public
pension fund and who, but for the fund as intermediary, would almost
certainly not be investing in a private offering, that suggests a greater
degree of publicness. If the third parties are financial institutions or
wealthy individuals, on the other hand, that suggests that the investor does
not serve a public mission.
An even clearer indication that an investor serves a public goal would
be its mission statement, if it has one. An institution dedicated to
administering retirement benefits on behalf of public employers, for
example, serves a public goal.174 Perhaps other missions could qualify,
such as facilitating saving for higher education expenses, but the amounts
held by public pension funds are far greater.175 The development of a list of
institutions or institutional goals classified as public could be a politically
vulnerable process, but given that institutions are likely to seek to avoid
limits on their investment options, the risk of such manipulation seems
low.
If an investor serves a public mission, then regardless of its
sophistication by other measures, its investments in private offerings would
be limited. Determining the limit presents its own challenges, which
highlight the absence of carefully considered baselines applicable to
investment activity undertaken in the public interest.176 As of this writing,
174
E.g., CalPERS at a Glance, CALPERS (June 30, 2014), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms
-publications/calpers-at-a-glance.pdf [https://perma.cc/63EW-E9EZ] (noting over 3000 total employers
in the CalPERS retirement program, including the State of California, school districts, and public
agencies, all of whom serve a public function).
175
Compare Sources of Estimated Total U.S. Retirement Plan Assets, 2012, EMP. BENEFIT RES.
INST., http://ebri.org/publications/benfaq/retfaqt4.jpg [http://perma.cc/SWD2-5LLD] (last visited Sept.
18, 2015) (listing state and local government pension funds that together manage in total more than
$4.5 trillion in assets), with Ron Lieber, Taxing 529 Accounts: A Plan that Went Awry, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2015, at B1 (stating that 529 college savings plans hold about $240.7 billion).
176
For example, multiple intermediary institutions complicate the inquiry. If a public pension
fund invests in a hedge fund, which in turn pursues an opportunity in the form of a private offering, the
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the default rule is that a pension fund may risk total loss on an investment,
even if the potential result could be inability to perform its obligations. A
far more conservative approach would prohibit investment if total loss
would have an impact on obligations to third parties within a set period of
time, perhaps a decade. The trigger level could be adjusted. The limit could
apply if a 90% or a 50% loss would have an impact, for example; the
maximum permissible size of the impact could also be adjusted, as could
the time frame in which that effect would occur.
Perhaps there is a normative justification for allowing investors serving
future retirees, for example, to risk total loss and resulting declines in
payouts to beneficiaries, but the case needs to be made. The status quo,
which ignores the public role that certain investing institutions play, cries
out for explanation and justification.
Put another way, investors serving public purposes should satisfy
requirements like those applicable to banks and some other financial
institutions. Some institutions must evaluate and disclose the riskiness of
particular investments, and methodologies exist for doing so. For example,
the SEC requires registrants to disclose “value at risk,” or VaR, defined as
“the potential loss in future earnings, fair values, or cash flows of market
risk sensitive instruments over a selected period of time, with a selected
likelihood of occurrence, from changes in interest rates, foreign currency
exchange rates, commodity prices, and other relevant market rates or
prices.”177
Some financial institutions, such as banks, must also perform “stress
tests,” which seek to determine how an institution would weather
changing, adverse circumstances, like falling asset prices or counterparty
defaults on obligations.178 These simulations can be complex, taking into
account the impact of an exogenous event on an entire portfolio, as well as
the impact of performance of a single investment or investment class.
Policymakers, thus, have a number of options in determining the steps that
a public pension fund would have to take to establish its capacity to fulfill
its public mission following investment in a private offering ranging from
focus on the individual transaction to assessment of an entire portfolio.
Such requirements can be gamed. Various approaches to risk
assessment exist and may be selected strategically. Overall, trust in
investors’ ability and willingness to evaluate risk accurately may be
misplaced. These criticisms have been leveled at regulations mandating
hedge fund may not necessarily be subject to the same limits as the pension fund. But the pension fund
could be required to limit its exposure to the hedge fund’s investments.
177
17 C.F.R. § 229.305(a)(iii)(A) (2014).
178
See Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 2236, 2238–39 (2014) (describing how “stress tests” help explain how financial systems respond
to dynamic and adverse marked conditions).
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assessment by banks, for example. Hopefully in the case of pension
funds, at least, the incentives should favor caution, in the interest of better
serving beneficiaries. However, it is possible that requirements like those
suggested in the preceding paragraphs could be manipulated.180 Unless the
harm of attempting to protect the public mission of a particular investor
outweighs the benefit, the idea merits careful consideration.
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to develop a particular
methodology for evaluation of risk, which is, itself, a question of great
depth and complexity.181 The core claim advanced is that such a
methodology should be a prerequisite to investing in a private offering for
investors with public missions. Demanding stress tests under multiple
scenarios, in which other investments perform well or poorly, could be
required in advance of particularly large and risky investments. The burden
of the disclosure itself would function as a screen, with only investors
more determined and able to satisfy regulatory demands going forward.
Beyond providing disclosure of risk exposure, a public-serving
investor could be required to disclose how the impact of a loss, whether
partial or total, would be managed. That plan could be submitted to an
independent reviewer, such as an outside auditor, for approval and
disclosure to the investor’s third-party beneficiaries. Again, the extent of
required risk management controls could vary with the riskiness of an
overall portfolio and the degree to which the investor had the resources to
honor its obligations within a particular time frame, among other factors.
The standard could be adjusted, but first the need for it must be recognized.
The imposition of sanctions in cases in which investors incorrectly
characterize their ability to withstand a total or partial loss on a particular
transaction raises additional questions. There should be a penalty following
deliberate misstatement—that is, misstatement made with scienter, as
evaluated in any securities fraud action alleging violation of Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act182 and rule 10b-5183 thereunder. Even in the

179
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 591, 631 (2013) (describing the shortcomings of such regulations).
180
Or simply applied mistakenly. As Professor Macey notes, “[t]he financial crisis [of 2008] . . .
showed that many of the VaR models [banks relied on] used faulty historical data and assumptions.” Id.
at 633. Professor Macey voices concern that the existence of regulations may create an incentive to
“alter . . . VaR models to lessen the apparent risk in what [is] actually an extremely risky series of
actions.” Id. at 634.
181
The Investor Advisory Committee to the SEC has proposed that, if the Commission maintains
hard financial thresholds for participation in private offerings, then it should consider “limiting
investments in private offerings to a percentage of assets or income,” a restriction that is perhaps more
easily implemented. RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 146,
at 8.
182
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012)).
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absence of wrongful intent, though, an investor might be barred from
future private offerings in the wake of a poor outcome in a past such
investment.184 The poor outcome would need to be disclosed to those
whose savings provide the investor with financial resources.
The purpose of modifying the exemption regime applicable to private
offerings to take into account investor purpose is not simply to protect
particular investors, however sympathetic public pension plans may be. So
far, public pension funds generally buy securities on public exchanges
rather than through private placements. Nor is the goal to exclude
unsophisticated, wealthy investors from these transactions simply because
they are unsophisticated. In financial transactions, as elsewhere, someone
often wins and someone loses. This Article does not suggest that investors
should be protected from losses every time that they make a poor decision.
But too many poor decisions and resulting losses may affect the
achievement of specific, desirable public goals, and those risks must, at
times, outweigh the right of investors to participate in particular
transactions.185 The potentially public effects of investment outcomes in
private offerings make them properly subject to restrictions. Government
regulatory constraints on investor conduct under these circumstances seem
reasonable because government policies that facilitate the entrusting of
public goals to pension funds make it possible for those entities to earn
quite a lot of money. The imposition of these restrictions would not be as
extreme a step as it might appear at first blush because the SEC amended
securities regulations not so long ago, in 1989, to enable public pension
funds to invest in private offerings.186 Before 1989, access to private
offerings was not limited in the nuanced and flexible way that this Article
proposes—it did not exist.
Applying the various tests described above, an extremely wealthy
individual with little expertise might, nonetheless, be permitted to invest in
a private placement involving a highly complex security, but a public
pension fund with billions of dollars under management might not. The
same criteria conceivably could apply to private pension funds and even
other institutions that invest for the benefit of retail third parties. In the
183
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”).
184
See supra note 160 and accompanying text (advocating for the SEC to propose a nuanced
definition of “accredited investor,” which would require that investors earn the right to future
investment).
185
Excessive risk-taking may also harm the health of the financial system on which investors rely,
and that system’s functioning may be considered a public goal as well. But that is not the emphasis of
this Article, as systemic risk is already a recognized priority of financial regulation.
186
See Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, 54 Fed. Reg. 11369 (Mar. 20, 1989)
(amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, and 239 to modify the definition of “accredited investor” to include
government benefit plans). The then-new rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.215, effected the change, and remains
in force.
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absence of a policy discussion over which institutions serve public ends
and which do not, a principled distinction is elusive. The discussion below
briefly illustrates how the above criteria might apply using the case of the
San Diego pension fund described in Part I.
C. A Brief Case Study: SDCERA Revisited
The litigation involving SDCERA, discussed above,187 illustrates how
the current investor classification scheme for private offerings manages to
be simultaneously overbroad and under-inclusive by barring investors that
may have the knowledge and skills to evaluate the risk posed by
transactions from private placements, while admitting investors that lack
the abilities and resources to evaluate risk and cope with poor investment
outcomes. An investor may have the experience and intelligence to analyze
a transaction and determine whether it is suitable,188 even though that
investor does not have significant wealth or income; conversely an investor
with sufficient assets may qualify as accredited or sophisticated even if
utterly lacking in expertise. Further, and as a result, the classification
regime may bar recovery through ex-post litigation even in the wake of
potentially fraudulent conduct because a court may find itself compelled to
conclude that a sophisticated investor should have better understood and
investigated the transaction before entering into it. SDCERA fell victim to
this Catch-22.189
Before describing the litigation, very briefly, here are the elements of
the kind of fraud claim made by SDCERA. The Supreme Court has
identified six elements of a fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and its implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5: “(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”190 The Court has defined scienter as
187

See supra Part I.
See Suitability, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTHORITY, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.ht
ml?rbid=2403&record_id=13390&element_id=9859&highlight=2111 [http://perma.cc/G8XV-3GGW]
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (describing the requirement of the self-regulatory agency of securities firms
that brokers limit their investment recommendations to securities “suitable” for the clients they serve).
Among the factors that a broker may consider in determining which investments are appropriate for a
particular client are “age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any
other information the customer may disclose to the member or associated person in connection with
such recommendation.” Id.
189
San Diego Cnty. Emp. Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(finding the sophistication of SDCERA made its investigation advisor’s reliance on allegedly
fraudulent statements unreasonable as a matter of law).
190
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (quoting Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011)).
188
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a mental state embracing “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”
To date, in cases involving claims of securities fraud, the Supreme
Court has not addressed the question of whether reliance by the plaintiff on
an allegedly false statement or omission must be reasonable. This is so
because the cases that have reached the Court have involved class actions
in which plaintiffs typically have invoked the presumption of reliance
allowed under the “fraud on the market” theory recognized in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson.192
However, lower courts hearing individual actions have wrestled with
the question of the reasonableness of reliance and, in cases pitting large
investors against large financial companies, that determination often poses
a significant stumbling block for institutional 10b-5 plaintiffs.193 For
SDCERA, this was the problem—it was too sophisticated an investor to
have been defrauded, as the institution’s lawyers argued it had been.
Indeed, under the current regime governing access to private offerings,
SDCERA was sophisticated. The same conclusion might well be reached
after applying the tests of investor characteristics as proposed above. But
the “publicness” criteria would create a high bar to the hedge fund
investment that cost SDCERA more than $150 million.194
According to its complaint, SDCERA invested $175 million in
Amaranth Partners (the “Fund”), a hedge fund, in 2005,195 in a private
offering.196 SDCERA alleged that Amaranth misrepresented and
fraudulently concealed its investment strategy, hiding the fact that the Fund
“operated as a single-strategy natural gas fund that took very large and
highly leveraged gambles,” and not as a diversified investor as was
claimed.197 When the price of natural gas fell in the fall of 2006, the Fund
began to lose money and lenders began demanding repayment of loans that
had helped fuel its natural gas purchases.198 Ultimately, the Fund lost more
191

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 45 U.S. 185, 19394 & n.12 (1976).
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (“The fraud on the market theory is based
on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business . . . .
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly
rely on the misstatements . . . .” (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3rd Cir. 1986))).
193
See Glater, supra note 14, at 88 (“[For] investors who purchased securities through a private
placement and subsequently allege[d] fraud . . . the challenge . . . is more likely to be demonstrating
reasonable reliance . . . .”).
194
Complaint at 2, San Diego Cnty. Emp. Ret. Ass’n. v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (No. 07-CV-2618).
195
Id. at 2.
196
See id. at 11 (stating that “[t]he Fund was structured as an unregistered pooled investment,
privately organized and administered by Advisors, a professional investment manager”).
197
Id. at 2.
198
Id. at 33 (stating that “[b]y September 28, 2006, the spread fell to 42 cents . . . [and] SDCERA
issued a written request for full redemption”).
192
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than $6 billion. SDCERA sued to recover on its investment.
Would SDCERA have been able to invest in Amaranth had it been
subject to the classification regime presented above and given its mission
to serve county employees? SDCERA is a public pension fund, as clearly
stated on its website.201 It has an explicit public mission: to provide for the
retirement income of employees of San Diego County.202 These employees
are third parties and retail savers, not other financial institutions with
resources of their own. SDCERA’s investment in private offerings
consequently would be subject to limitations, and the only question would
be the nature and extent of those limits. The answer would turn on the
institution’s ability to make payments to its beneficiaries over a period of
ten years, assuming a total loss of its $160 million investment. This
disclosure would have to include anticipated rates of return on the rest of
the institution’s portfolio over the same period of time, thus giving some
idea of the ease of managing the total loss. Further, SDCERA could be
required to provide a description of a plan to mitigate the risk of the
investment, by identifying hedges against the private offering, for example.
As a result of these various constraints, SDCERA could very well have
been barred from participating in the private offering and not suffered
losses that hampered its ability to serve the county employees relying on it.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has described a regime directly addressing the problem of
classifying investors, some of which may lack the ability to conduct due
diligence even when they have the will to do so, some of which may lack
the resources to monitor investments once made even if they do have the
expertise to evaluate a transaction, and some of which may lack the means
to absorb losses and still fulfill valued, public obligations. The
participation of such an investor in private placements is risky to the
investor, of course, but also to counterparties, counterparties to those
counterparties, and beneficiaries of the investor, who all suffer the fallout
when a transaction generates losses.
Post-financial crisis securities litigation has highlighted the inadequacy
of the current regime governing eligibility to invest in private offerings,
which has permitted investors with significant assets but perhaps a degree
of sophistication that is not commensurate to participate in complex and
risky transactions. Market participants have grown more diverse, but the
categories into which they are divided have not; the definition of
199

Id. at 2.
Id. at 12.
201
Pension Facts, SAN DIEGO CNTY. EMP. RET. ASS’N, http://sdcera.org/pension_facts.htm
[http://perma.cc/7WU5-22VS] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
202
Id.
200
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“accredited investors” requires careful rethinking. Further, investments
increasingly serve public ends, providing retirement income to workers, for
example. The classification regime outlined in this Article takes into
account the purpose of the investment, thus addressing the particular risks
posed by poor decisions by institutional investors that manage assets
intended to perform significant, public roles.
The concept of publicness is challenging to explore, and defining its
scope requires wrestling with deep questions about what serves a common
interest. Although this Article has focused on a more manageable subset of
investors, public pension funds, and the particular regulatory regime
governing access to private offerings, the implications of developing a
broader and more complex understanding of what it means to be public
extend much further and could encompass a variety of additional financial
intermediaries providing income to support other public policy goals. The
goal of this Article is to broaden the conversation about publicness,
recognizing that there are myriad means by which we collectively seek to
achieve public ends.

